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Abstract 
This paper summarizes the evaluations of micro and small scale enterprise 
projects financed by the U.S. Agency for International Development, the European 
Investment Bank, the International Labor Office, the United Nations Capital Develop-
ment Fund, the United Nations Development Program, and the World Bank. The eval-
uations suggest that a concensus is ·emerging towards the idea that minimalist credit 
projects offer the best method of providing sustainable services valued by small scale 
entrepreneurs. There is considerable disagreement, however, about the economic role 
that micro and small scale enterprises play in the economies of developing countries, and 
the economic benefits obtained from assistance programs designed to support them if 
they have debateable efficiency and prospects for growth. 
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SUPPORTING MICRO AND SMALL SCALE ENTERPRISES: 
WHAT CAN BE LEARNED FROM DONOR PROGRAMS? 
by 
Richard L. Meyer 
INTRODUCTION 
Considerable attention has been focused on rural nonfarm enterprises in recent years 
by donor agencies and development specialists. Micro and small scale enterprises have also 
been the subject of many recent studies. Undoubtedly, some of this interest is due to the 
growing realization that large scale, modern industrialization strategies of previous decades 
have failed to solve the problems of underemployment and poverty (Liedholm and Mead). 
In recent years, it has been popular to view support for microenterprises as being an 
effective way to stimulate the private sector's contribution to growth and equity objectives 
of developing countries. Nongovernmental (NGOs) and private voluntary organizations 
(PVOs) have become particularly active in support programs of credit, training and technical 
assistance for urban and rural small scale enterprises. 
The purpose of this paper is to present a summary of the large and growing literature 
about donor experience in attempting to meet employment and income objectives through 
assistance to the rural nonfarm sector with particular emphasis on micro and small scale 
enterprises. Key conclusions about these experiences are presented with emphasis on those 
with implications for rural development in the Philippines, and for the research to be 
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conducted in the Dynamics of Rural Development Research Program of PIDS. Much of 
the literature available in this field is of two types. One type concerns the experience of the 
donor or international agency in providing assistance to countries through projects designed 
for micro and small scale enterprises. Many of these enterprises are located in rural areas 
and/or are closely linked to the agricultural sector. Since many of the assistance projects 
involve credit, this paper necessarily focuses on the lessons learned in attempting to provide 
credit services to this target clientele. The second type of literature concerns an economic 
analysis of the group or sector being assisted. This literature seeks to answer economic 
questions such as the role of micro and small scale enterprises, many located in rural areas, 
in creating employment and generating income, the efficiency and profitability of various 
firm sizes, and the dynamic process of enterprise creation and growth. 
A COMMENT ON DEFINITIONS 
The first problem encountered in conducting a literature review encompassing several 
studies, countries, and authors is the wide range of definitions used to identify and study 
enterprises, firms and sectors. The terms "small" and "micro" are used to describe size of 
firm, usually measured in terms of employment or assets. The term "microenterprises" refers 
to the smallest size firms, frequently employing only the owner/ entrepreneur and his/her 
family with only a few hired workers. Although some small scale firms operate on a modern 
industrial basis, most are generally organized as "cottage industries" with limited manage-
ment specialization and division of labor. The terms small and micro also frequently imply 
"informality" because these firms tend to fall outside the sphere of influence, regulation and 
support of government. Informality gives these firms the advantage of avoiding restrictive 
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government regulations, but also can restrict their access to formal finance, and broader 
markets, technologies and information systems that would enable them to grow and benefit· 
from economies of scale. 
The term "nonfarm enterprises" has been applied to the heterogenous set of 
enterprises that are found on and off farms, but that are not included in the typical farm 
production study (Meyer, 1991). Processing activities conducting within the farm household 
are often included within this definition. In addition, these enterprises include economic 
activities found in villages and small towns, often closely linked to agriculture by providing 
inputs, or processing and marketing farm outputs. These enterprises are distributed across 
all firm sizes, but much of the research has focused on those which fall within the micro and 
small size category.· 
The emphasis of industry studies tends to be on "manufacturing", but in fact the rural 
nonfarm sector includes a wide range of service and trading enterprises and other firms 
indispensable to the agricultural sector, and that provide a large amount of employment and 
income, especially for women, in many countries. Most donor credit programs, however, 
have only recently recognized the value of including non-manufacturing activities in their 
list of projects eligible for funding through subloans. 
For the purposes of this paper, the term rural nonfarm enterprises will be used to 
encompass that heterogenous set of economic activities that are found on and off the farm, 
but usually strongly linked to agriculture. They tend to be small in size, measured in assets 
or employees, use largely traditional methods of production and simple forms of organi-
zation. No effort is made to specifically include "agribusinesses" in this review because the 
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agribusiness literature often focuses on larger size firms, frequently with international 
linkages, and using modern production, processing and marketing techniques. Undoubtedly, 
large scale agribusinesses are important in shaping the speed and nature of rural 
development, and in indirectly creating opportunities for smaller scale, more traditional 
enterprises in the rural nonfarm sector. However, they are less frequently the focus of 
donor assistance programs, and in some countries there is a sharp debate about the growth 
and equity implications of using large scale, multinational agribusinesses as the engine of 
rural development. It is possible that broader based, more equitable development will occur 
through stimulating the growth of smaller, more traditional enterprises and firms. 
DONOR EXPERIENCES 
Several reports summarizing donor experiences and recommendations concerning 
rural and microenterprises are now available. The purpose of this section of the paper is 
to highlight the key findings of several recent reports. 
U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT (AID) 
In many ways AID has been a leader among the donors in support programs for 
micro and small enterprises. The early PISCES project evaluated several attempts to 
provide assistance to these enterprises. Later, the ARIES project and now the GEMINI 
project continue that tradition. AID has also been important in supporting research about 
small enterprises and the rural nonfarm sector. Carl Liedholm and colleagues at Michigan 
State University have conducted research in this field with AID support since the 1970s. 
HIID at Harvard has a long history of research on the financial sector of Indonesia, some 
of it supported by AID, that has helped reveal how financial reforms in that country have 
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helped the small scale sector. Finally, in 1988 and 1989, AID undertook and published the 
results of a major stocktaking of its experience in microenterprise development (Boomgard). 
Liedholm and Mead prepared a paper in 1987 that represented a comprehensive 
synthesis of MSU research findings up to that date. The conclusions were largely drawn 
from in-depth studies conducted in selected survey areas in six countries: Sierra Leone -
1974-75; Bangladesh - 1978; Jamaica - 1978; Honduras - 1979; Thailand - 1979; and Egypt -
1981. The small scale industries studied included those establishments with fewer than fifty 
workers engaged in manufacturing activities or related repair work. 
The analysis of the sampled firms revealed that they collectively account for the vast 
bulk of industrial employment, are located in rural ares (localities with less than 20,000 
inhabitants), most are very small employing fewer than five persons, virtually all are 
privately owned and are organized as sole proprietorships, and the proprietors and family 
workers make up most of the labor force. The amount of capital used by these firms is 
modest but larger than that required for petty trading or unskilled service activities. Most 
of the funds for establishing or expanding these firms comes from personal savings, relatives 
or retained earnings. Only a small amount came from formal financial sources or 
governments. The economic activities of these small scale firms appear to be increasing in 
absolute terms along with the employment absorbed by the small scale private sector. 
The ·factors influencing the demand for and supply of small industry goods and 
services produced by the small scale industries were examined. Contrary to the expectations 
that these firms produce inferior goods, recent studies have revealed a strong positive 
relationship between demand and growth of household income. A second source of demand 
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is found in the strong backward and forward linkages with the rest of the domestic economy, 
especially agriculture and large scale industry. On the other hand, government and foreign 
demand was limited for most firms. 
With respect to supply, most studies reveal that small scale industries are efficient 
users of capital by generating more employment per unit of capital than large scale firms. 
Output per unit of capital of small firms also tends to exceed large firms. Studies of the 
social benefit cost ratio of small versus large firms in Sierra Leone, Honduras, and Jamaica 
revealed they were greater than one and larger for small firms in 10 out of 12 industry 
groups analyzed, but there are wide variations in efficiency among the small firms. The 
small firms that are most likely to be economically efficient tend to: 1) use hired workers, 
2) operate in workshops away from the home, 3) operate in localities with more than 2,000 
inhabitants, and 4) are involved in product lines with better economic prospects, such as 
tiles, furniture, baking and repair activities. An important finding is that one-person firms 
were frequently on the margin of economic viability. 
Liedholm and Mead concluded that small scale firms can be enhanced by policy 
changes that reduce the bias against small firms, and especially those controls that restrict 
interest rates and encourage lenders to ration scarce funds to traditional larger scale clients. 
Policies that promote small scale farming are also important because of. the powerful 
stimulus for small scale enterprises. 
Projects rather than policy reforms, however, have been the primary methods used 
by government and donors to support small enterprises. Relatively few entrepreneurs 
receive this assistance, however. Special credit programs designed to assist small and 
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medium size firms often end up providing little credit to the smallest firms. The AID 
stocktaking, however, concluded that some programs can reach the smallest firms on a self-
sustaining basis with minimal subsidies. Liedholm and Mead argue that the most successful 
programs that provide nonfinancial assistance are those that attempt to supply a "single 
missing ingredient", but that position has been debated by Boomgard. They also argue that 
projects assisting existing firms are more likely to be successful than those attempting to 
establish new ones. Similar to the World Bank experience summarized below, they argue 
that successful projects tend to be built on proven existing institutions. 
The AID stocktaking evaluation represented a major effort by AID to evaluate what 
was learned about what works and what doesn't work in its microenterprise projects 
(Boomgard).1 It focused on identifying projects and programs with proven effectiveness in 
generating and sustaining developmental benefits, and in analyzing the factors responsible 
for their success. Throughout the study, microenterprises were defined as firms that employ 
10 or fewer full-time workers. 
By the mid 1980s, AID was involved in at least 87 active microenterprise projects or 
programs in 35 countries. A purposive sample of 32 projects and programs located in 20 
countries was selected for detailed study in the stocktaking. They were selected because 
they targeted assistance to microenterprises, and some analysis of beneficiary impact was 
available. In almost all cases, the project or program studied either began operations in the 
1980s or AID's involvement began at that time. Data were obtained from existing 
1 This section draws heavily from my earlier review of the Boomgard report. 
Another synthesis of the stocktaking evaluation was published by Levitsky. 
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evaluations and site visits to 10 countries. Seven programs were selected from Asia, 
including the large scale Indonesian BKK program, 11 from Africa, and 23 from Latin 
America. They are being implemented by PVOs, government agencies and credit unions. 
Some programs provide only credit to their beneficiaries, while others also provide training 
and technical assistance. 
Three distinct approaches to enterprise development were identified in the study. 
The enterprise formation approach attempts to help highly disadvantaged groups or 
individuals from the survival economy develop viable businesses. Programs following this 
approach often serve a relatively large proportion of new entrepreneurs and offer a 
comprehensive range of services focused on the creation of rudimentary business skills, 
resulting mostly in income generation rather than in new employment. 
The enterprise expansion approach tries to improve the performance of existing 
microenterprises. It is essentially minimalist because it emphasizes small improvements for 
many firms, often providing only credit. The graduation of firms into small enterprises is 
largely left to natural selection, rather than project effort. 
The enterprise transformation approach actively tries to graduate entrepreneurs from 
micro to small enterprises, often by providing an integrated mix of credit, training, and 
technical assistance. The firms assisted are typically somewhat larger than those involved 
in the other approaches so employment generation plays a relatively larger role. Both the 
formation and transformation approaches are transformation-oriented, and place heavy 
emphasis on technical assistance and training. The expansion approach, on the other hand, 
tries to support existing enterprises, and this accounts for the minimalist credit orientation. 
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Six of the sampled projects and programs were found to emphasize enterprise 
formation, 22 enterprise expansion, and 14 enterprise transformation. Because of multiple 
subprojects, the total number exceeds the total sample size. A relatively small number of 
programs in Latin America emphasize enterprise formation, while a relatively large 
proportion in Asia and the Near East fall in the expansion category. The sampled programs 
were evaluated on three criteria: beneficiary impact, cost-effectiveness, and institutional 
sustainability. The latter criteria considered the three dimensions of financial, organiza-
tional and environmental sustainability. 
The principal results of the evaluation are summarized in Table 1. The enterprise 
expansion data are presented in columns three, four and five. Column three gives the 
results for these programs treated together. Since the group is heterogeneous, the results 
for the six programs which operated primarily as financial institutions are presented 
separately in column four, and the results for the remaining programs are summarized in 
column five. In several cases data are missing, and in other cases there was wide variance 
among the programs within a particular group. Therefore, some of the differences in mean 
values appear large but are not statistically significant, as noted in column seven. 
Most microenterprise programs serve only a few hundred clients; the exceptions are 
the financial institutions that serve thousands. Women represent a significant share of total 
beneficiaries in all programs. The formation and transformation programs tend to serve a 
larger percentage of manufacturing firms compared to other types, but the differences are 
not significant. Average program costs also are higher, but not significant, for these 
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programs as would be expected with the larger amount of training and technical assistance 
provided their clients. 
The average loan size in transformation programs exceeded $3,000 compared to 
approximately $500-700 in the other programs. This finding suggests that attempts to 
graduate microenterprises to small scale firms requires a large enough change in the firm 
to justify a relatively large loan. The relative loan size can be seen by comparing average 
loan size relative to GDP per capita. The transformatiOn programs provide loans that 
average ten times the average GDP per capita, while other programs provide loans roughly 
one to two times GDP per capita. 
Most programs provide 25 to 45 percent of their loans to finance fixed assets. The 
financial institutions in the expansion programs, however, provide mostly working capital 
which is consistent with their objective of helping clients make marginal improvements in 
their businesses. By lending mostly working capital, these institutions also face less stringent 
staff requirements, so it is easier to operate large scale institutions reaching thousands of 
clients. 
The data in the bottom three lines of Table 1 give some indication of the 
comparative cost-effectiveness and financial sustainability of the programs. Because of the 
modest services provided and their large scale operations, the average program cost is lowest 
for the expansion programs with an average of just under $0.50 per dollar lent. Transforma-
tion programs on average cost double that amount, while formation programs cost six times 
more. One good indication of a program's ability to recover costs is reflected in the interest 
rate charged on loans. The expansion programs charge real interest rates that average up 
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to 25 percent, while the other programs have a large subsidy element because they only 
charge 0 to 3 percent. Even the relatively high rates in the expansion programs do not 
cover program costs however. 
The challenge to recover costs is further complicated by loan delinquency and 
default. The programs report loan arrearages ranging from 16 to 24 percent on average. 
If only half of these actually result in losses, loan losses of 8 to 12 percent are too high for 
most programs to sustain without continuous infusions of outside funds. The expansion 
programs come closest to meeting self-sufficiency, but generally the other programs are far 
it. Financial self-sustainability is closest to being achieved in the best managed programs 
which limit their assistance to low cost financial services, such as the BKK and KUPEDES 
·programs in Indonesia. Importantly, it was observed that credit programs that strive to 
become self-sustaining, even when the goal is unattainable, generally perform better than 
those that expect continuing external support. Organizations that think of themselves as 
businesses that live or die on the basis of earnings behave differently than if they are not 
subjected to this market test. 
The evaluation concludes that direct assistance programs that aim to improve the 
performance of microenterprises without attempting to transform them into more complex 
businesses have a better record of achievement than do more ambitious transformational 
programs. They typically provide small working capital l«?ans with efficient screening, rapid 
disbursement and a reasonable assurance of the availability of larger loans upon repayment. 
The beneficiaries are poor, but not the poorest of the poor. Benefits of the programs are 
modest for each client, but increase the income of many clients rather than create large 
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amounts of employment. The organizations implementing these programs adopt a 
businesslike attitude towards achieving a large volume of lending and operate in a market 
area large enough to achieve economies of size. The evaluation also identified important 
qualitative factors affecting institutional performance, such as a clear, unambiguous mission, 
strong leadership, well-trained and dedicated staff, good management information systems 
and an ability to adapt to changing circumstances. 
The stocktaking results present a dilemma for microenterprise support programs. On 
the one hand, programs may reach a large number of participants on a self-sustaining basis 
if they limit their support to small working capital loans. But this limited serVice may not 
meet the total needs of many enterprises. On the other hand, it is more difficult to achieve 
self-sufficiency if programs attempt to provide expensive training and technical assistance 
services for their clients. Furthermore, graduation from special microenterprise programs 
is difficult so an alternative is to graduate entire microenterprise programs into credit 
retailers for larger size loans for longer term purposes. 
In spite of the mixed results achieved in these programs and projects, the report 
recommends that AID continue to fund microenterprise support projects. One reason is 
related to AID's interest in stimulating policy change. The overall business and economic 
environment in a country has a strong influence on the opportunities available for profitable 
business ventures. By promoting successful microenterprise interventions, AID can become 
involved in policy dialogue concerning the need for and desirability of policy reforms. AID 
can also be a strong advocate for the small business community. Implementing projects 
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provides a practical way to accumulate information and influence decisions in addition to 
supporting research or including conditionality in foreign assistance programs. 
A second benefit of AID support of microenterprise projects concerns the 
development of financial markets. The report argues that formal financial institutions resist 
lending to the small scale sector not so much because of perceived risk but because of huge 
transaction costs. Innovations to reduce these costs that are introduced, tested and 
perfected in projects may open up formal lending to successful small scale entrepreneurs. 
These innovations may also lead to the development of new lending institutions willing to 
serve a small scale clientele . 
. 
EUROPEAN INVESTMENT BANK (EIB) 
The European Investment Bank (EIB) completed a review of its lending program for 
small scale enterprises in 1989. The results were reported in APRODI, EIB and by Carter 
et al. Except as noted, this synthesis is drawn from Carter et al. 
Since 1976, the EIB has financed projects in 66 ACP (Asian, Caribbean and Pacific) 
countries with its own resources raised in international capital markets and with risk capital 
provided by the EC countries. Frequently, own resources are used for on-lending, while risk 
capital is used for equity participation or studies. About 22 of its operations have been 
channelled through local financial institutions, generally development finance corporations 
( dfcs ). In the 12 year period ending at the end of 1988, US $363 million had been 
committed of which nearly 60 percent went to 660 SME projects. Two thirds of the funds 
came from own resources and one third from risk capital. A total of 42 countries 
participated (27 African, 11 Caribbean, and 4 Pacific) of which 16 were classified as poor 
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with per capita incomes of less than $450. Operations in the lower income countries have 
benefitted most from risk capital. 
The average size of subloan in these projects was substantially larger than AID 
projects at $322,000, but a third were for less than $165,000. The average size tended to be 
larger in larger countries. The real average size has been falling over time suggesting that 
the dfcs are becoming more effective at reaching smaller entrepreneurs. Sikty percent of 
the enterprises financed employed less than 50 employees, and 40 percent has annual 
expected sales of less than $850,000 per year. Since most dfcs are prevented from funding 
publicly owned enterprises, most enterprises are owned by local businessmen, and more than 
half by a single family. 
About 60 percent of the subloans went to finance new projects, 26 percent to expand 
existing enterprises, and 14 percent to rehabilitate and modernize enterprises. About two-
thirds were for import substitution, 17 percent for export projects, and 19 percent for 
services. Foodstuffs, tourism and textiles received the largest total allocations. The majority 
of projects were close to a debt/ equity ratio of 2: 1, but equity contributions were higher for 
new projects. The ex-ante economic rate of return was estimated at over 20 percent for 77 
percent of the subloans, and between 11 and 20 percent for 20 percent indicating that 
expected returns are quite high. The projects in total were expected to directly create 
28,000 jobs at an average cost per job created of $28,000. 
A post-implementation review was undertaken by having the dfcs respond to a 
questionnaire for a random sample of 120 projects. Interpretation of the results requires 
caution because the dfcs might have given more favorable responses than are justified, and 
• 
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the impact of structural adjustment recently undertaken in some countries may produce 
greater financial problems for some projects in the future than reported here. 
The review showed there was a weak correlation between the ex-ante rate of return 
and project success, and projects tend to do well if they get off to a good start. Excluding 
projects for which a·company had not yet been established, at the time of the survey about 
half of the borrowers operated profitably, a third operated at a loss, and the remainder were 
in receivership or liquidation. These proportions were not significantly different across the 
three regions. The most commonly cited reason (45 percent) for difficulty or failure was 
market problems, especially dominant in the Caribbean. Technical and management 
problems were listed next, and a shortage of foreign exchange ranked third. The results 
suggest that market forecasts of borrowers tend to be overly optimistic, and the difficult 
economic circumstances in many ACP countries is manifest in weak markets rather than 
foreign exchange shortages for entrepreneurs. Data on project capacity utilization also 
reflected over-optimism in project appraisals. The average capacity utilization was about 
two thirds, but was significantly higher (70 percent) for expansion projects, and lower (55 
percent) for new projects. 
The more successful projects as measured by company profitability were generally 
of two types: a) export oriented using local raw materials, and b) domestic oriented using 
imported raw materials. Capacity utilization was highest in the former. Structural 
adjustment which changed relative prices in favor of domestic inputs appears to have 
benefitted export oriented firms. Conversely, the domestic oriented firms using imported 
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inputs may have benefitted by high levels of protection which may put them in difficulty in. 
the future with structural adjustment. 
The financial structure of a project was not an important source of project failure, 
and many industries were able to bear foreign exchange risks without prejudicing their 
financial stability. About a third of the projects had been in arrears on their loan payment 
to the dfc, and about a third had rescheduled their loans. On the other hand, nearly 90 
percent of the profitable SMEs never had problems with debt service. 
The evaluation highlighted the importance of the quality of the assistance given by 
the dfcs to local entrepreneurs (EID). The on-lending rates of many institutions have often 
been too low relative to inflation and to the margins required for sustainability. This 
problem plus their internal weaknesses in appraisal and supervision contribute to the finan-
. cial difficulties of many dfcs. When subloans experienced problems, the dfcs have rarely 
been in a position to provide anything other than purely financial solutions. 
The evaluation also noted the need for greater stability of economic policies if SMEs 
are to prosper. Greater use of the commercial banking system in projects was also 
advocated to help develop local financial markets and financial intermediation. The EID 
was encouraged to provide greater support for technical assistance in its projects, to allow 
lending rates to be determined by market forces, and, contrary to the views of several other 
donor agencies, to more effectively target economic sectors, scale of enterprises, and sizes 
of subloans. 
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INTERNATIONAL IABOR OFFICE (IW) 
The ILO recently completed its second progress report summarizing activities 
undertaken within the World Employment Program in the field of rural small industries and 
nonfarm activities (IW). These include research; advisory services to governments; design 
and implementation of technical cooperation projects; evaluation of projects, programs, and 
policies; and collection and dissemination of information. The report contains a summary . 
of the evaluations that assess the impact of their projects on rural small industrial 
enterprises (RSIE). The evaluation conducted by the ILO, UNDP, UNIDO and the 
government of the Netherlands between 1985 and 1987 appears to have had a major impact 
·on ILO views. This evaluation produced several recommendations with some of the most 
relevant ones summarized as follows: 
1. Macroeconomic policies. Macro policies that favor growth of rural income should 
be given priority in RSIE development strategies and preferably should precede 
supply-side support measures. Likewise, the development of an agricultural surplus 
is a precondition for stimulating RSIE. Donors and agencies should focus on 
persuading countries to adopt appropriate macro policies or insist on these policies 
as a precondition for supply-side assistance. 
2. RSIE support programs. Supply-side support to enterprises is most effective if the 
demand environment is favorable and if it consists of partial input "missing 
ingredient" support to existing RSIE. Subcontracting from. larger to smaller industries 
should be promoted through special training and extension programs. General 
purpose small industries development agencies should concentrate on those functions 
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they perform most effectively. Credit should be made available in as decentralized 
a form as possible, and the role of non-bank financial intermediaries should be 
enlarged. Mobile training units should be stimulated for technical upgrading 
programs. Greater use should be made of NGOs and PVOs as agents of change. 
Existing institutions should be used to implement projects rather than setting up new 
ones. Technica.l cooperation designed to strengthen RSIE institutions should first 
carefully screen them for their effectiveness. 
3. Donor coordination. Donors and agencies should harmonize their external assistance 
procedures and coordinate their field activities in support of RSIE. 
It is obvious from this synthesis that the ILO has been heavily influenced by the idea 
that macroeconomic policies must be set right before RSIE projects can expect to be 
effective. There are no suggestions presented, however, as to how changes in policies might 
have a differential impact on certain types and sizes of firms, and therefore influence the 
effectiveness of RSIE projects. As noted in the EIB evaluation, policy reforms will likely 
improve economic prospects for some small firms, while making it more difficult for others. 
This fact will have an impact on projects that target specific firms. 
UNITED NATIONS CAPITAL DEVELOPMENT FUND (UNCDF) 
A review was conducted of the credit components of projects funded by the United 
Nations Capital Development Fund - UNCDF (Jackelen). From 1966 to December 1987, 
the UNCDF obligated $112 million in 93 projects with credit components in 17 mostly Asian 
and African countries. The credit components amounted to $31 million channelled through 
-- -----------------
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a variety of delivery mechanisms. Eighty-three of the 93 projects were concentrated in 
agriculture, industry and irrigation. 
Fifteen projects representing 30 percent of all budgeted credit components were 
selected for a detailed desk review. Three types of credit delivery mechanisms were used 
in these projects: Type A - financial institutions; Type B - grassroots institutions including 
cooperatives, village associations and communities; Type C - a mix of financial and non-
financial institutions. Two small industry projects in Burundi and Yemen fell into the Type 
A category. These projects encountered problems of the type frequently alleged to prevent 
financial institutions from making small industry loans, namely security requirements were 
high even when the project specifically exempted them, transaction costs were high for small 
loans, the loan approval process was time consuming, and the financial institutions have 
little capacity for outreach and supervision of loans made. Recovery rates were low not 
necessarily because of financial difficulties of the entrepreneurs, but because of the 
perception that the loans were "soft." 
Two small industry projects in The Gambia and Bangladesh fell into the Type C 
category using a combination of financial and non-financial institutions. In these two cases, 
a bank was used to provide loans, while a government extension service provided direct 
assistance to borrowers. Both projects were poorly implemented because of a lack of clear 
definition of responsibilities, field staff were not effective and neither project had a well-
developed staff training program, the banks did not have adequate accounting systems to 
provide timely information on problem cases, and the projects were not designed to develop 
adequate delivery mechanisms to accomplish their goals. 
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The evaluation concluded that the sampled projects, regardless of type or sector of 
operations, shared a number of weaknesses. They included a lack of clear definition about 
the role of the credit or revolving funds provided by the UNCDF to the project, interest 
rates too low to cover costs, a neglect of savings mobilization and good accounting and 
management information systems, an inability to properly assess the capabilities of the 
participating institutions prior to project start up, a lack of effective technical assistance for 
these institutions, especially in the critical linkage between the delivery institution(s) and the 
borrowers, and a failure to incorporate traditional informal credit customs and practices into 
the projects. 
In spite of the evaluation's generally negative conclusions about UNCDP credit 
projects, it recommends that credit projects should continue to be part of UN CDP programs. 
A variety of recommendations are made about how to make them more effective. Little is 
said, however, about the nature of the economic activities to be funded and the problems 
that projects can expect to face when serving low income people who are the clientele of 
UNCDF programs. 
UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM (UNDP) 
An evaluation of credit programs of the UNDP is reported in Ashe and Cosslett. A 
review was conducted of 750 projects approved by the UNDP between January 1987 and 
mid-April 1988 to determine which were related to credit. A total of 51 (7.1 percent) of the 
projects either related to or contained credit. The detailed breakdown was as follows: 
1. 33 Type I projects with a credit component, 
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2. 8 Type Il projects in which the UNDP provides technical cooperation to UNCDF 
projects that contain credit, 
3. 3 Type Ill projects in which the UNDP provides technical cooperation for credit 
funds provided by international development banks, and 
4. 7 Type IV projects in which the UNDP provides technical cooperation to credit 
operations in the banking sectors of developing countries. 
A total of $62.6 million, or 6.8 percent of UNDP funds, went to these projects. Projects in 
Africa and Latin America/Caribbean received most of the funds in all categories of project 
types. 
For the Type I and II projects, 44 percent were directed at microenterprises, 34 
percent served farmers, 7 percent assisted fishermen, and 2 percent provided credit to assist 
housing construction. Poor people were predominately the intended beneficiaries for 70 
percent of the projects. The majority of the credit components were in the form of 
revolving funds, and the second most common type were guarantee funds. The project 
documents contained little information about the design of credit components, operational 
costs or project efficiency, cash flow, loan payment, probable project impact, or demand for 
funds. Sixty-one percent of the projects lack information on the likely number of borrowers 
to be served, 85 percent lack information on estimated loan size, 76 percent do not specify 
length of loan, and 83 percent fail to indicate interest rates to be charged. With this 
information lacking, it was impossible to estimate the sustainability of most projects. 
To assess UNDP experience with project implementation, 16 credit projects were 
selected for a review of their evaluations and project files. More than half the projects were 
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executed by F AO in agriculture, forestry and fisheries, so there is limited information on 
rural nonfarm or microenterprises per se. In fact, all the project evaluations were sketchy 
and important basic information, such as amount of funds disbursed and average loan size, 
was not provided. Sustainability was a key problem identified in the evaluations: In some 
cases the loan fund was not sustainable due to inflation and poor loan recovery. Secondly, 
institutions were not created that are able and willing to provide credit to the poor on a 
long-term, on-going basis. Thirdly, there were not sustainable increases in capital for loan 
programs provided either out of domestic or donor sources. 
This evaluation also contains a set of guidelines for the design and implementation 
of effective credit projects. The guidelines argue that credit projects will be most successful 
' if the borrower, among other characteristics, is a member of a solidarity group or other 
group guarantee, has a need for short-term credit, and have two employees or less. These 
recommendations, therefore, imply a minimalist, non-targeted, solitary based approach to 
microenterprise lending. No attempt was made in this evaluation to define the type of 
borrowers or sectors that are likely to be successful over the long-term. 
WORLD BANK 
A comprehensive review of fifteen years of World Bank experience in lending to 
small and medium enterprises (SMEs) was recently completed by Webster.2 The general 
objectives of these projects include: strengthening the financial and technical institutions 
that serve SMEs, job creation, and correction of financial market imperfections that 
2 A summary of the report is also available in the 1990 journal article cited in the 
bibliography. Both the original report and the summary were drawn upon for this 
synthesis. 
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constrain small borrower access to credit. The revfow evaluated 70 World Bank projects in 
36 countries representing $3.2 billions in loans covering the fiscal years 1973 (when Bank 
SME lending was initiated) through 1989 (when 33 of the projects were completed).3 The 
study emphasized how to build viable and sustainable financial and technical assistance 
programs serving SMEs, and does not deal with financial and industrial policy reforms or 
project impact at the firm level. 
Projects in the Asian and Latin American regions each represented about one-third 
of the volume of loans made, but the African region had the largest number of total projects 
(21 out of 70) and is the region where World Bank SME operations are increasing. Almost 
60 percent of the funds disbursed in the 33 completed projects went to firms engaged in 
metal products, food processing, and textiles and garments. The average subloan size for 
the completed projects was $35,000, but within a project there is a wide range in subloan 
sizes. The fact that actual subloan sizes were far below the maximum allowable is 
interpreted as evidence that retail banks will not always make only the largest loans 
authorized in a project. Projects in Asia and Latin America have been able to reach smaller 
borrowers than in other regions because the pool of eligible borrowers is larger, commercial 
banks have been used more frequently than development banks and they tend to make 
3 There are some discrepancies in the amount of SME lending reported by the 
World Bank. Webster reports that SME lending since 1980 has been relatively 
constant averaging about $200 million annually. Dessing, however, states that 
42.3% of the $11 billion lent by the Bank to the private sector was channeled to· 
SMEs from 1983 to 1988 (p. 2). This would imply $800-900 million lent per year 
during that period. 
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smaller loans, and the cost of doing business is lower, especially compared to the African 
reg10n. 
The completed projects created an estimated 600,000 jobs with approximately half 
this total represented in just two projects in Indonesia. The average cost per job created 
was $4,675. Many Asian projects performed well in creating a large number of jobs at an 
average cost of $3,171, compared to $9,850 in Africa. The African projects appear to 
involve relatively more subloans to purchase capital equipment rather than using existing 
equipment and increasing the number of people employed as appeared to be the more 
common approach in Asia. 
The projects were evaluated on three criteria: the loans were small, the number of 
jobs created surpassed expectations, and the institutions were substantially improved through 
the project. For completed projects, 55 percent (18 of 33) achieved or surpassed at least 
two of the three primary objectives, 12 percent reached one objective and 33 percent failed 
to reach any of the primary goals.4 
The more successful projects had many of the following characteristics: 
1) Presence of favorable pre-existing country conditions, such as: 
a) strong demand for services provided by the project, 
b) effective institutions and individuals, 
c) sufficient leadership and commitment to the goals of the project, and 
4 The first World Bank SME project in the Philippines was classified in the second 
group, while the second project fell into the first group. 
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d) political, economic and regulatory environments 
stable enough to allow project completion without 
frequent and substantial shifts in policies and 
institutional leadership. 
2) Selection of the strongest available institutions to implement projects, which 
sometimes required resisting governmental pressures to utilize poorly 
functioning public agencies. 
3) Good project designs matching local demand for services with existing 
operations and capabilities of implementing institutions. The better projects 
shared these design characteristics: 
a) they were extensively prepared with in-depth 
analysis of the most promising sub-sectors to 
promote, 
b) demand for credit and technical assistance was 
judged fairly accurately, 
c) delivery systems were designed to fit within 
existing institutional operations, and 
d) program size and complexity were consistent with 
institutional ability. 
4) Particularly capable individuals held key leadership and management positions 
in the project delivery system. 
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The sustainability of credit and technical assistance programs was evaluated by 
assessing subloan repayment rates, the degree to which institutions incorporated SME 
services into their normal operations, and the record of repeat projects in given countries. 
The average repayment rate was 80% (highest of 92% in Latin America, and lowest of 61 % 
in Africa). Eight of the 33 completed projects had subloan repayment rates of 90% or 
more, 15 had rates of 70 to 90 percent, and 10 had rates below 70 percent. A positive 
correlation was found between high repayment rates and per capita GNP, but little 
correlation between repayment and overall macroeconomic and regulatory conditions, and 
business environment. A consistent feature of successful projects was the retail banks' 
abilities to select viable subprojects, disburse funds efficiently and supervise projects. 
World Bank SME credit projects employ lines of credit for borrowers channeled 
through the formal banking system, either directly to a single intermediary or through a 
second-tier system to retail banks. Forty-two of the projects employed apex credit delivery 
systems, 12 involved disbursements by development finance institutions, and 16 used 
alternative arrangements. The projects using apex credit systems, typically involving a mix 
of commercial banks and development finance institutions, were more effective as measured 
by smaller subloan sizes; higher job creation rates with lower costs, and higher subloan 
repayment rates. Public finance institutions with a general industrial finance mandate 
performed poorly as single intermediaries in SME loans, particularly in Africa Subloan 
sizes have been relatively high, job creation has been low, and repayment rates have been 
low. The major factors that have contributed to the typical problems of DFis include weak 
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and frequently shifting leadership, government interference, overall inadequacy and 
inefficiency, and failure to develop operational strategies consistent with small borrowers. 
Most project components designed to provide technical assistance (TA) for 
entrepreneurs have failed to meet objectives in quantity and quality of services delivered. 
Poor project design, inadequate preparation and supervision by the World Bank, and poor 
implementation by government and public institutions were identified as reasons for these 
poor results. The more successful projects have had fewer TA components, have been 
specific to a selected group of beneficiaries, were built on an existing successful program, 
and provide services delivered to groups of persons with similar occupations. 
Recent World Bank SME projects, many of which are in Africa, have been designed 
to 1) promote greater involvement of the private sector in delivering technical assistance to 
SMEs, 2) broaden microenterprise access to credit and TA, 3) promote female entrepre-
neurs, and 4) increase the overall number of entrepreneurs. They offer the potential of 
reaching smaller, and perhaps previously underserved groups through specially designed 
programs, but the weak institutional capacity of many institutions selected for project 
implementation is a real concern. The reliance on NGOs in many projects may be 
problematic, given their typical small size relative to large World Bank projects. 
A World Bank report by Dessing specifically analyzes the challenge of supporting 
microenterprise in Sub-saharan Africa. The report summarizes the literature on various 
types of programs to assist microenterprises. The author describes the two main strategies 
for supporting microenterprises as 1) the top-down indirect approach, and 2) the bottom-up 
direct approach. The first seeks to improve the business environment by changing 
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microeconomic variables such as prices, government regulations and policies, and by 
building up the physical infrastructure. This "getting-the-prices-right" strategy is consistent 
with a laissez faire doctrine of government, and relies on people's creativity and initiative 
to respond to new opportunities and incentives. The second approach aims at supporting 
microenterprises directly and assumes a more active involvement of the people in necessary 
structural adjustments. This support often takes the form of credit, training and technical 
assistance. 
Dessing advocates a third approach which combines the so-called process and 
minimalist approaches. Emphasis is placed on improving access to credit because of the fact 
that entrepreneurs frequently report it as their most important constraint, and several 
minimalist credit programs have been successful at reaching a large number of borrowers, 
especially the Grameen Bank in Bangladesh and the BKK in Indonesia. She advocates an 
approach in which NGOs, PVOs, business associations and government organizations as 
second-tier intermediaries are linked with the formal banking system. The second-tier 
intermediary may eventually evolve or graduate into a formal institution (or bank), whereas 
the concept of graduating the microentrepreneur, although frequently espoused, is difficult 
to achieve in practice. 
An often neglected aspect of microenterprise support is capacity building/upgrading 
of the institutions that support these businesses. The quest by donors for short-term visible 
results mitigates against this longer-term development support. Dessing argues, however, 
that institution building should be incorporated into the microenterprise support project as 
an explicit objective, and should be included in the budget. Donors can also assist NGOs 
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by providing management information, by sharing their often more extensive expertise and 
research documentation, and by helping hire external expertise. There is an inherent 
conflict, howeyer, that must be resolved in that most NGOs have a social orientation while 
donors seek economic efficiency. This fact leads some NGOs and PVOs to categorically 
reject government and donor support. 
DEBATE ABOUT THE ROLE OF SMALL SCALE ENTERPRISES 
The evaluations reviewed in the previous section reflected a concern for two types 
of issues. First, the donor agencies are increasingly concerned about the sustainability of 
their programs. At one time, much of their concern was to document the efficiency of small 
scale firms that they were committed to assist because of equity objectives. But as evidence 
mounted that many of the programs they supported are not sustainable, they shifted their 
attention towards factors that influence sustainability. The current popularity of minimalist 
credit programs reaching large numbers with efficient operations, high loan recovery rates, 
and interest rates high enough to cover costs reflects this shift. Instead of detailed targeting 
of types of enterprises to be assisted, donors now tend to target only the end users, not the 
end uses. 
The second issue which is most evident in the literature surrounding AID and World 
Bank programs, but largely ignored by other institutions, concerns the economics of the 
small scale sector. Some of the evaluations recognize the important role of microeconomic 
policies in affecting the performance of the small scale sector, but don't deeply probe into 
the question of how the structure of the economy changes with development and growth, 
and whether it really is useful to assist the small scale sector. The purpose of this section 
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is to highlight some of the issues that are reflected in the debate about the future of the 
small scale sector in developing countries. 
A recent workshop sponsored by AID provided a forum for a review of what has 
been learned through AID's support of small, micro and informal enterprises.5 Emphasis 
was placed on discussing the research conducted in the Employment and Enterprise Policy 
Analysis (E.E.P.A.) Project. Snodgrass presented a paper which summarized the debate 
about the role of small and medium manufacturing enterprises in industrialization and 
economic development. He defined SMEs as firms employing fewer than 100 workers. He 
argued that India was one of the first developing countries to advocate small scale 
industrialization as early as its 1956 Industrial Policy Resolution. Subsequent research has 
documented the positive role of SMEs in the development of China, Taiwan, Japan and 
Columbia. As noted in the previous section, the research summarized by Liedhohn and 
Mead suggests a positive role for SMEs in several developing countries. The research by 
Little, Mazumdar, and Page of India and other developing countries, however, arrives at a 
somewhat different conclusion. They did not find that small, especially very small, manufac-
turing enterprises are relatively efficient users of resources. In fact, medium size firms often 
· are more efficient. 
Snodgrass argued that the industrial structure of many developing countries is 
dualistic. There are a large number of small firms, a substantial number of large firms with 
100 or more employees, and in between the "missing middle" in which there are few firms 
and relatively little employment. There is also a large diversity in productivity among firms. 
s The proceedings of this Workshop are reported in DEVRES. 
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Labor intensity is greater among industries than among firm sizes, so promoting labor-
intensive industries rather than small firms may be a more efficient way of promoting 
employment. 
As countries develop, Snodgrass believes that average firm size rises in manufacturing 
and productivity and wage differences narrow. The rise in firm sizes occurs for two reasons: 
1) the industrial structure shifts in favor of industries in which firms tend to be large, and 
2) firm size grows within industries. These trends are due to changes in technology, 
demand, transportation and information costs, firm strategies, and government policies. 
Interfirm productivity and wage differentials narrow because of improved economic 
integration as economies develop and the marginal contribution of resources tends to 
equalize across firms and industries. 6 Biggs and Oppenheim argue that the aggregate size 
distribution of firms will be influenced by policy bias with respect to size, to sector or to 
both. The best way to reduce the share of large firms in manufacturing is likely to be the 
elimination of bias in favor of industries in which output is concentrated. Furthermore, it 
will often be counter-productive to implement policies which attempt to improve the 
competitiveness of small and medium firms. 
Following this same line of thought, Snodgrass argues that small firms in low income 
countries are reservoirs of surplus labor. Only a few have the potential for developing into 
medium and large firms, and it is difficult to identify them in advance. Policies that 
explicitly favor small firms, by providing subsidies through differential application of 
minimum wages, taxes, zoning, etc., can actually inhibit their growth into medium sized firms 
6 A paper by Biggs and Oppenheim presents empirical tests of these arguments. 
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and accentuate the missing middle. On the other hand, the favorable policy treatment that 
large firms have obtained for themselves should be eliminated in order to obtain a more 
level playing field for competition. 
The E.E.P.A. series of studies attempted to delineate recommended policies for 
different types of country situations. Snodgrass advocated a role for active government 
support of industrialization, including the participation of SMEs, if it is performance-based, 
such as was the case in Taiwan and South Korea. The trick, of course, is to limit 
government assistance to those firms that really merit it. The E.E.P.A. research in the 
Philippines,7 Ecuador and Honduras concluded that import substitution policies biased 
against SMEs causing them to remain small and/ or informal. It is argued, therefore, that 
these countries need to reduce their anti-labor and anti-SME policies, and open themselves 
to more foreign competition. 
The African countries pose the largest challenge and disagreement within the 
E.E.P.A. research project. The Michigan State collaborators in the project argue that micro-
level intervention is needed to create the conditions for economic growth. The HIID group 
represented by Snodgrass, however, is skeptical because they feel that such interventions are 
expensive and often ineffective. But, they offer no suggestions as to what should be done 
to create productive SMEs in economically stagnant African countries. 
7 The Philippines research is reported in Biggs, et. al. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
The most striking difference noted in the several donor evaluations summarized 
above is the wide range in sizes of loans provided by the various projects. At the low end 
are the $500-700 loans provided in the AID funded projects. At the high end are the $200-
300,000 loans in the EIB funded projects. The World Bank average loan size of $35,000 
falls in between these two extremes. The small size loans appear to be focused on simply 
helping family based firms, while the larger loans seem to be part of projects that aim to 
increase employment. 
In spite of these differences, there is a surprising degree of consensus that emerges 
in these evaluations. First, the donors are increasingly concerned about project sustain-
ability. This preoccupation seems to arise from the criticism that many donor supported 
activities either fail during the life of the project, or cannot reach a level of performance so 
they can continue once the donor support is terminated. Therefore, several evaluations seek 
to identify those factors that contribute to ~ustainability. 
Second, there appears to be a decline in donor concern about what borrowers are 
using loans for and the impact the loans are having on them. Some years ago, donors were 
heavily involved in targeting the end use of loans so that funds would be channeled into so-
called productive purposes. There was also a concern about measuring the impact of the 
projects on the poor. Today, there is a greater appreciation of the difficulty in measuring 
impact because of the fungibility of loan funds. There appears to be a greater acceptance 
now that a positive impact can be assumed if entrepreneurs value a program enough to 
borrow, repay, and become repeat borrowers. 
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Third, the macroeconomic environment in which small scale firms operate was 
mentioned in several evaluations as a factor that should be considered when designing a 
support project. But there is relatively little concrete evidence presented of the extent to 
which the environment was a major cause of success or failure of a project, or the small 
scale firms it was attempting to assist. Few guidelines are provided about what specifically 
should be looked at in project preparation besides the general issue of policy bias towards 
large scale industries. The extreme view is that projects should not even be undertaken . 
unless the macroeconomic environment is first improved. 
Fourth, there appears to be consensus emerging about the characteristics of a 
successful micro and small scale support project. It should be minimalist providing few 
services besides loans, reaching thousands of beneficiaries, operating on a commercial basis 
with interest rates high enough to cover costs, and a strong effort to recover loans. 
Solidarity group lending is often advocated as the means to efficiently lend and recover 
loans. Emphasis is on targeting the poor as end users of loans, but not the end uses. Loans 
should be directed towards enterprise expansion, rather than enterprise formation or 
transformation. Institutions to implement projects should be screened carefully, and many 
require considerable assistance themselves before they can efficiently operate loanprograms. 
Fifth, NGOs and PVOs are advocated as preferred implementing institutions, but 
there is a concern about how many are actually capable of the task. like government 
agencies, many require considerable strengthening because their strong advocacy and 
commitment to the poor is not a sufficient attribute for operating a sustainable program. 
.. 
35 
A sixth characteristic of these evaluations is their concern for client graduation. Most 
projects operate on the assumption that after an initial period of special assistance, small 
scale entrepreneurs will be able to graduate to a commercial banking institution to get 
loans. But in . practice this rarely happens so there are suggestions that entire programs 
should eventually evolve or graduate into commercial institutions. 
Seventh, it is rather surprising that the evaluations say so little about savmgs 
mobilization. Increased attention to savings could have three benefits. First, savings 
mobilization would give support institutions another source of funds to help offset the 
uncertainties of donor or government funds. Second, some small scale entrepreneurs will 
benefit as much from a secure place to hold their savings as they will from getting loans. 
Third, encouraging entrepreneurs to save will help them to develop the concept of a 
continuous banking relationship, usually necessary for graduation to a commercial 
institution. 
Eighth, except for AID, donors support surprisingly little analysis about the role of 
small and medium enterprises in the development process. The sustainability and growth 
of support services to these enterprises is inextricably linked to how well the sector performs 
over time. For example, firms that subsist on producing inferior goods will find it difficult 
to survive as incomes rise and consumers seek higher quality products. Providing support 
for these firms will accomplish little. 
A ninth point that emerges is that the documentation available to evaluators is 
generally of poor and irregular quality. This appears to be a problem both for project 
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design documents as well as monitoring and evaluation reports. This casual approach to 
documentation may help explain the unbusinesslike institutions that donors often support. 
Finally, the tenth observation is that none of the evaluations proposed that the donor 
discontinue or reduce its support for the small scale sector in spite of all the difficulties 
identified by the evaluations in past projects. This reflects an optimism that past shortcom-
ings can be rectified. It probably also reflects a certain pragmatism by the evaluators; 
support for microenterprises is currently an important donor "fad" and funds will be pumped 
into these projects until a new fad comes along to replace it. Furthermore, a strong NGO 
and PVO constituency has been built up that will continue to pressure for its involvement 
in these types of projects. 
. 
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Table 1 
KEY RESEARCH FINDINGS 
Enterprise Expansion 
Financial Micro- Enterprise Statistically 
Enterprise lnsti- Enterprise Trans- Significant" 
Item Formation Total tution Program formation 
Number of projects 6 22 6 16 14 
Average Years in Operation 3.7 4.0 7.3 2.7 2.3 yes 
Average Number of Annual Beneficiaries 328 87,871 393,172 642 264 yes 
Average Percentage of Women Beneficiaries 59 43 41 43 27 no 
Average Percentage of Beneficiaries 54 40 23 44 60 no 
in Manufacturing 
Average Program Cost per Beneficiary ($) 948 575 N.R. 575 2,549 no 
Average Loan Size ($) 508 705 676 714 3,261 yes 
Average Loan to GDP per Capita 1.3 1.2 2.2 0.9 10.2 yes 
Average Percentage of Fixed Assets Loans 25 20 9 26 45 no 
Average Program Cost per Dollar Lent ($) 3.24 0.46 0.51 0.43 1.08 yes 
Average Real Interest Rate 3 23 17 25 0 no 
Percent of Loan Funds in Arrears (%) 24 17 22 16 18 no 
"Statistically significant at the 5 percent level. 
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